1. Abstract

Founded in 1982, the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council (AIMC) is a specialised Ministerial Council of the League of Arab States made up of the Interior Ministries of its signatory states. The AIMC enables the cooperation of Arab countries in the fields of internal security and prevention of crime, notably by facilitating the apprehension of wanted individuals through the diffusion of their arrest warrants. The AIMC’s legal basis, found in instruments including the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation and the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, notably allows for politically motivated extraditions to take place, which are explicitly prohibited by the Arab Charter on Human Rights. Contrary to INTERPOL, which it collaborates with, the AIMC does not appear to have an oversight body destined to filter out abuses of its systems, nor does it grant targeted individuals the possibility to file access requests or to demand the removal of arrest warrants diffused against them. Recent cases illustrate how the AIMC’s triggering of wanted individuals’ arrest and extradition processes contributes to violating international human rights standards such as the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in article 3 UNCAT and article 5 UDHR. Overall, the AIMC raises serious human rights issues which must be adequately addressed and remedied.

2. AIMC: mandate, structure and functioning

The Arab Interior Ministers Council (AIMC) is a specialised Ministerial Council of the League of Arab States.[1] The AIMC aims to develop and strengthen cooperation and coordinate efforts between Arab countries in the field of internal security and prevention of crime.[2] It notably lays down the general policy in order to develop joint Arab action in the field of internal security, approves joint Arab security plans to implement this policy, and establishes the necessary bodies and agencies to implement its aims.[3] The AIMC essentially acts as a link between its member states for judicial assistance regarding security and criminal matters.[4]

The AIMC’s head, Secretary General Dr. Mohammad bin Ali Kuman, is appointed by Member States for a renewable three-year term.[5] Mr Kuman, who obtained academic degrees in Saudi Arabia and in France, has held this position since 2001.[6] The General Secretariat is located in Tunis, Tunisia, and acts as AIMC’s technical and administrative body. It is divided into five specialised offices located in five member states, namely: the Arab Office for Supporting Security Services Affairs (Baghdad, Iraq), the Arab Bureau for Drugs and Crime Affairs (Amman, Jordan), the Arab Bureau for Civil Protection and Environmental Affairs (Rabat, Morocco), the Arab Office for Security Awareness and Media (Cairo, Egypt) and the Arab Office for Combating Extremism and Terrorism (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).[7] It is through these bodies that the AIMC’s decisions, notably regarding counter-terrorism, are implemented.[8] Furthermore, each member state has a communication division which enables coordination between states and with bodies of the AIMC and facilitates cross-border cooperation.[9]

Regarding the practical functioning of the AIMC, when a wanted person has not yet been arrested and their whereabouts are unknown, often because they have left the country, the state in which the person is wanted can file a request to the AIMC. The AIMC can then transmit the state’s arrest warrant to all Arab League Member States by circulating it between its communication divisions, amplifying its effectiveness and the likelihood of apprehending the wanted person. As the AIMC is made up of Interior Ministries operating as organs of the Member States’ governments, it has the ability to locate individuals within the country without having to wait for the wanted persons to present themselves to the authorities at, for example, an airport or border crossing.[10]

3. Legal framework

3.1 AIMC’s Basic Laws

The AIMC’s Basic Laws was adopted by the League of Arab States in 1982.[11] The text does not make reference to any human rights standards nor does it grant individuals the right to file an access request or to demand the removal of arrest warrants diffused against them. Similarly, it does not mention standards of procedure regarding the circulation of arrest warrants or human rights standards.[12]

Nevertheless, the AIMC held an international conference on challenges to security and human rights in the Arab region in its headquarters in 2015, during which the implementation of human rights obligations through guidelines of security institutions was addressed.[13] Furthermore, AIMC’s official website includes a section dedicated to human rights,[14] which includes a video of an arrested person being made aware of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in which various human rights such as the right to counsel and habeas corpus are respected.[15] The website of the OHCHR is also listed as one of their ‘important links’.[16]

3.2 Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation

The Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation (hereinafter “Riyadh Convention”)[17] was adopted and endorsed by the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice in 1983 with the aim to facilitate judicial cooperation between its signatory Arab countries.[18] It notably foresees the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements provided that they do not violate certain rules including the fundamental principles of Shariah law.[19]

Regarding the matter of extradition, article 41 of the Riyadh Convention contains several exceptions under which extradition cannot be carried out, including if “the crime for which extradition is requested is considered by the laws of the requested party as a crime of a political nature”. Despite this prohibition of extradition for political offences, the Convention excludes a number of offences from being defined as political, notably assaults on kings and presidents as well as robberies committed against individuals or authorities.[20]

3.3 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism

The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism[21], the implementation of which is monitored by the AIMC,[22] was adopted by the AIMC and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice in 1998 as a component of the AIMC’s Strategy against terrorism.[23] According to article 1 of the Convention, terrorism is defined as “any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardise a national resource”.

The 1998 Convention affirms its commitment to the UN Charter and stresses its promotion of peace and advocacy for the protection of human rights. With regards to extradition, although its article 6(a) prohibits extradition for offences regarded as having a political nature under the laws in force in the requested State, similarly to the Riyadh Convention, article 2(b) excludes from these offences a list of conducts such as attacks on heads of states and destruction of public property, as well as all acts falling within the scope of the Convention’s definition of terrorism.

3.4 Relationship between INTERPOL and AIMC (MoU of 1999)

Aside from bilateral treaties on judicial assistance in criminal and extradition matters, INTERPOL and the AIMC constitute the two main routes of communication for international assistance in the Middle East and North Africa region, Arab Gulf included.[24] In 1999, the AIMC and INTERPOL signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU), providing a scope of cooperation including exchange of information, mutual consultation and coordination, database access, and technical cooperation in criminal matters and other matters of interest.[25] Article 2 of the MoU states that “Interpol and AIMC General Secretariat shall ensure full and prompt exchange of non-nominal information and documents concerning matters of common interest.”

The agreement’s preamble emphasises “the role of the police authorities in maintaining law and order with due respect for human rights”. According to INTERPOL’s spokesperson,     INTERPOL and the AIMC each have their own database and corresponding legal framework, and neither organisation can dictate to the other what action to take in relation to wanted persons.[26] If AIMC member countries communicate with the AIMC or use its channels in relation to individuals, INTERPOL is not involved in any way, nor can it intervene.[27] INTERPOL does not work on notices or diffusions directly with the AIMC, the reference to ‘technical cooperation’ in the MoU simply reflecting standard language for memoranda of understanding and agreements.[28]

4. Individual cases

The extent of AIMC's involvement in extradition proceedings is unknown. However, we would like to highlight two recent politically motivated extradition proceedings involving AIMC.

4.1 Sherif Osman

Sherif Osman is a U.S.-Egyptian political commentator who posted a video on his YouTube channel in which he called for a peaceful protest during the visit of U.S. President to Egypt to attend COP27. Likely due to this video, during a family visit to Dubai, Osman was arrested on 6 November 2022. As a consequence, he faced extradition to Egypt, where he risked being subjected to torture.

On 8 November, he was brought before the Public Prosecutor, who informed him that he was arrested on the basis of a red notice issued by INTERPOL at Egypt’s request. The Prosecutor vaguely referred to Osman’s videos dating back to 2019. However, it was later clarified that the warrant was circulated through the AIMC. The Public Prosecution gave Egypt 30 days to submit a comprehensive extradition request. On 30 November 2022, Osman’s detention was extended for another 30 days. Since his arrest, Osman was denied the right to challenge the legality of his detention and faced numerous impediments to his right to access a lawyer, who could not visit him in prison.

Although he was allowed to leave the UAE and went back to the United States on 27 December 2022, it remains unclear whether the UAE formally rejected Egypt’s extradition request.[29] After a complaint regarding this matter was filed to them, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression submitted a communication to the Egyptian Government, who provided a response which is presently pending official translation.[30]

4.2 Hassan al-Rabea

Hassan Muhammad al-Rabea is a Saudi national from the Shi’a minority whose family has faced a long history of persecution, with several of his relatives executed or on death row. Fearing persecution himself, Mr al-Rabea left Saudi Arabia and arrived in Morocco in June 2022. On 19 October 2022, Saudi Arabia’s Public Prosecution Office issued an arrest warrant against Mr al-Rabea, stating that Mr al-Rabea is suspected of “collaboration with terrorists by having them agree and collaborate with him to get him outside of Saudi Arabia in an irregular fashion”. Such acts, according to the arrest warrant, fall under article 38 of the 2017 Law on Combating Terrorism Crimes and its Financing, which carries a prison sentence of between 10 to 20 years.

On 22 November 2022, AIMC circulated a request for provisional arrest against Mr al-Rabea upon Saudi Arabia’s request. Following a five-month stay in Morocco, he was arrested at Marrakech airport on 14 January 2023. After his first and only hearing on 1 February 2023, the Rabat Court of Cassation ruled in favour of Mr al-Rabea’s extradition to Saudi Arabia, where he risks being subjected to torture, on the basis of the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, more specifically its articles 5 and 23. He was effectively extradited on 6 February 2023.[31]

5. Arguments

The AIMC’s dissemination of arrest warrants raises issues regarding international human rights law standards. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism’s definition of “terrorism” has been criticised for many of its elements being undefined and for generally being too broad, leaving space for wide interpretation and abuse.[32] For instance, this definition allows for the simple threat of an act to be constitutive of terrorism.[33] “Threat” being undefined in the Convention, this may lead to the criminalisation of acts of freedom of expression consistent with international law.[34] The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms expressed concern over the impact of such a broad definition on restricting the freedom of expression, human rights defenders and critics of the state.[35] The restrictive interpretation of political offences found in the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism as well as in the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation enable the AIMC to trigger the extradition of individuals on political grounds, which is inconsistent with international human rights standards. These concerns are of particular importance as the AIMC is made up of ministers who have the power to carry them forward at the national level.[36]

The OHCHR has expressed concern over the “serious challenges to human rights and the rule of law posed by States’ counter-terrorism measures”, notably through “repressive measures (...) used to stifle the voices of human rights defenders, journalists, [and] minorities”, as well as by the return of “persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activities to countries where they face a real risk of torture or other serious human rights abuse, thereby violating the international legal obligation of non-refoulement”.[37] As demonstrated through the cases of Sherif Osman and Hassan al-Rabea, the AIMC’s systems are being used to persecute peaceful political activists and persecuted minority members putting them at risk of torture and other human rights violations in the requesting states. We believe that the issuance of politicised arrest warrants without any prior and continuous oversight may lead to violations of the rights to freedom of belief, opinion, expression and peaceful assembly enshrined in articles 18, 19 and 20 UDHR, 18, 19, 21, 22 ICCPR as well as articles 24 and 32 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights. It is important to note that article 28 of the Arab Charter explicitly prohibits the extradition of political refugees. Should a review mechanism be established, it would be undermined by the lack of reference to human rights standards in the AIMC’s basic laws.

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files can, at the request of individuals, remove a red notice if found to be in violation of INTERPOL’s constitution and rules, it is deleted from the organisation’s systems. Similarly, the Notices and Diffusions Task Force, an institution established by INTERPOL’s Secretary General in 2016, may also unilaterally review red notices on the basis of all available information, including information received from member countries other than the requesting country, and media monitoring. Although all Arab League member states are also members of INTERPOL, such a system does not appear to have been set up by AIMC.

We also find it concerning that, despite all member states of the Arab League being parties to the UN Convention on Torture, which guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, the Riyadh Convention does not refer to the non-refoulement obligation enshrined in article 3 UNCAT and article 5 UDHR.

With AIMC’s meetings being closed, their meeting agendas not being announced in advance and their documentation not being accessible on their website, there is no accessible information regarding measures implemented to check and filter out abuses of its systems and it is generally very difficult for human rights organisations to engage with them.[38]

6. Conclusions and requests

In light of the foregoing, MENA Rights Group and Freedom Initiative call on the AIMC to:

• introduce human rights standards in AIMC’s Basic Law;
• set up mechanisms allowing individuals the right to file an access request or to demand the removal of arrest warrants diffused against them;
• institute a specific process to conduct compliance checks on arrest warrants requests from every AIMC member country.