The period since Qatar’s last Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2014 has seen the ascent of Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, who took the throne following the voluntary abdication of his father. Despite some first attempts at political reform, the state’s political and institutional configuration does not allow for a strict separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) severed all diplomatic ties with Qatar and enforced a trade embargo over its alleged support of terrorist organisations and close links with Iran.[1]  This was followed by the expulsion of Qatari citizens from their respective territories and a call for the return of their nationals living in Qatar within 14 days.[2] On 23 June 2013, the three countries and Egypt issued a list of demands to be fulfilled by Qatar in order for sanctions to be lifted.[3] 

In the wake of the Gulf Diplomatic Crisis, there have been a number of human rights developments, some of which have been constructive, and others more worrying. Among the constructive developments is the state’s recent ratification of the international human rights covenants. On the other hand, the adoption of the Cybercrime Law has restricted freedom of expression online, and amendments to anti-terrorism legislation have weakened due process and fundamental safeguards in national security cases.

1.1 Scope of international obligations

Qatar acceded to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in May 2018.[4] However, it made a number of reservations[5] and declared that it would interpret particular provisions in line with Sharia Law.[6] This includes the definition of “punishment”, thus enabling the continued use of capital and corporal punishment. In addition, Qatar stated that the definition of “trade unions” would be interpreted in line with domestic legislation, denying migrant workers – who make up 90% of the national work force – the right to unionise.[7] 

Furthermore, Qatar has still not ratified the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR, ICESCR and Convention against Torture (UNCAT), nor has it ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED).[8]

Recommendations

• Withdraw all reservations and declarations to the ICCPR and ICESCR; 
• Ratify the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR, ICESCR and UNCAT;
• Ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC and the ICPPED.

1.2 Constitutional and legislative framework

During its last UPR cycle, Qatar accepted five recommendations on abolishing the exit visa system for migrant workers.[9] To this end, in September 2018, it adopted Law No.13 of 2018,[10] allowing foreign workers to leave Qatar without acquiring the consent of their employers. However, the new law is still not in conformity with international standards, as it allows employers to request that up to 5% of their workforce seek prior consent before leaving the country.[11] It also excludes certain types of workers, such as domestic workers and those working in the military and the public sector.[12] 

In addition, while Qatar claimed to have “already implemented” nine recommendations on freedom of expression during its last UPR,[13] it nevertheless adopted the Cybercrime Law in October 2014, which restricts online freedom of expression.[14] Under this law, the publication of “incorrect news” harmful to the state’s reputation or public order is punishable with up to three years in prison and a fine of 500,000 Qatari Riyals (137,000 USD).[15]

Recommendations

• Abolish the exit visa system for all migrant workers;
• Amend the Cybercrime Law to bring it into line with international standards on freedom of expression.

1.3 Human rights infrastructure

Despite having been granted an “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions’ Sub-Committee on Accreditation in 2015,[16] Qatar’s National Human Rights Institution – the National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) – is not in full compliance with the Paris Principles.

The NHRC is insufficiently independent of the executive. It was both established and reorganised in 2010 by emiri decrees,[17] and the nomination, appointment and dismissal of its members is subject to approval by the emir.[18]  The NHRC is financed entirely by the state and the executive retains the power to both allocate funds to the institution and decide on its expenses.[19]

Further, Decree Law No.17 of 2010 does not specify the authority to which the NHRI is accountable. As such, it fails to ensure its independence from the government. 

Recommendation

• Ensure that the NHRC is in full compliance with the Paris Principles, particularly by amending Law No.17 of 2010 in order that the requirement to be answerable to parliament is clearly enshrined in law.

2. Cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and bodies

In June 2018, the Committee against Torture (CAT) adopted its Concluding Observations following its review of the third periodic report of Qatar. The Committee noted the lack of information provided by the authorities on at least 11 occasions.[20] In addition, it raised its concern that recommendations from previous Concluding Observations on fundamental legal safeguards, the abolition of corporal punishment, investigations into acts of torture, and violence against women had not been implemented.[21]

Furthermore, Qatar has failed to respond to three of the eight communications it has received from UN Special Procedures since the second UPR review.[22]

Recommendation

• Fully cooperate with the UN human rights mechanisms, particularly by responding to all UN Special Procedures’ communications, and effectively implement recommendations made by the CAT, including by respecting the follow-up procedure.

3. Implementation of international human rights obligations

3.1 Freedom of expression

Domestic legislation in Qatar continues to criminalise acts falling under freedom of expression both online and in print. Article 8 of the Cybercrime Law punishes defamation with up to three years in prison and a fine of up to 100,000 Qatari Riyals (27,470 USD).[23]

The Law on Publications and Publishing regulates the media in Qatar. It punishes “criticism of the emir” and the publication of “prohibited materials” with up to six months in prison and a fine of up to 3,000 Qatari Riyals (824 USD).[24] This can also lead to an administrative investigation of the offending publication, along with the confiscation and destruction of printed materials, and the closure of the publication.[25]

Similarly, Article 134 of the Penal Code punishes with up to five years in prison anyone who publically challenges or criticises the emir, deputy emir or the crown prince.[26]

Recommendation

• Decriminalise defamation and amend the Cybercrime Law and the Law on Publications and Publishing to bring them into line with international standards on the right to freedom of opinion and expression.

3.2 Freedom of peaceful assembly and association

The rights to peaceful assembly and association continue to be severely restricted in both law and in practice, with Qatar rejecting both recommendations on the issue during its previous review.[27]

The Law on Public Meetings and Demonstrations provides that no public gathering can take place without a licence.[28] Further, Article 9 provides that the organisers of public meetings are responsible for ensuring that they “do not exceed their purpose”, by violating “the tenants of religion”, “public order or public morals” or by “defaming the reputation of states”.

Public meetings held without a licence are punishable with up to three years in prison and a fine of up to 50,000 Qatari Riyals (13,740 USD).[29] The law further punishes anyone who knowingly attends or publicises an unlicensed public meeting with at least one month in prison and a fine of up to 20,000 Qatari Riyals (5,495 USD).[30]

Similarly, Law No. 12 of 2004 provides that institutions and associations can only be established if granted a licence.[31] Article 14 severely restricts unionisation, prohibiting professional associations and their members from “stopping work or inciting others to stop work, or participating in or making statements not related to the profession”. Similarly, Article 35(3) stipulates that ministers may dissolve an association for “engaging in political activities”. 

Under Article 43 of the law, establishing an association without a licence or carrying out prohibited activities is punishable with imprisonment of up to one year and a fine of up to 50,000 Qatari Riyals (13,740 USD).

Recommendations

• Bring domestic legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly into line with international standards, in particular by decriminalising unauthorised public gatherings and amending Article 9 of the Law on Public Meetings and Demonstrations; 
• Revise Law No. 12 of 2004 in order to remove undue restrictions on the establishment of associations and institutions and their activities.

3.3 Independence of the judiciary

During its last UPR, Qatar claimed to have “already implemented” a recommendation on building an independent judiciary.[32] Despite this, upon her country visit in 2015, the former Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers noted a clear lack of separation of powers between the judicial and the executive branches of government.[33]

All presidents and judges of ordinary Qatari courts are appointed by an emiri order or emiri decree upon the recommendation of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.[34] Similarly, members of the prosecution and the attorney general are all appointed by the emir.[35]

Furthermore, there is no written code of conduct for judges, and the emir has the competence to dismiss both judges and prosecutors if this is deemed to be in the “public interest”.[36]

Finally, non-Qatari judges continue to be employed under temporary contracts that must be renewed annually, leaving them vulnerable to dismissal and undue influence.[37]

Recommendation

• Guarantee the independence of the judiciary, including by ensuring the tenure of foreign judges and establishing a written code of conduct for judges.

3.4 Torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment

3.4.1 Definition, absolute prohibition and criminalisation of torture 

There are no provisions in domestic Qatari law that enshrine the absolute prohibition of torture, and the state has made vague reservations to Articles 1 and 16 of the UNCAT.[38]

Furthermore, a number of the punishments for acts of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment enshrined in the Penal Code do not constitute “appropriate penalties” as set out in Article 4(1) UNCAT. For example, the sentences prescribed in articles 159, 159 bis and 160 only refer to a maximum penalty, and therefore fail to take into account the gravity of the offence.[39]

Finally, Article 48(1) of the Penal Code excludes criminal responsibility in cases where public servants are “executing the order of a superior”, in violation of Article 2(3) of the UNCAT.[40]

Recommendations

• Enshrine the absolute prohibition of torture in national legislation and lift reservations to Articles 1 and 16 of the UNCAT;
• Bring criminal punishments for acts of torture into line with international standards, particularly by setting a minimum penalty for acts of torture and ill-treatment that reflect their gravity;
• Adopt clear provisions stating that no order from a superior officer or a public authority may be invoked as justification for torture or ill-treatment.

3.4.2 Counter-terrorism and national security

Qatari counter-terrorism legislation lacks legal certainty and allows for derogation from fundamental safeguards enshrined in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Law on Combating Terrorism (as amended in 2017) defines terrorism in overly broad terms.[41] In addition, Article 18 states that an individual can be held in “precautionary detention” for a period of up to six months upon the decision of the public prosecutor.[42]

Furthermore, Article 2 of the Law on the Protection of the Community permits the use of pre-trial detention, with the approval of the prime minister, for up to one year for crimes related to “public morals” and “public decency”.[43] The penalty is doubled if the offence relates to state security.

Under the Law on the Military Intelligence Service, military personnel may be held in custody for up to four weeks, and any other individual may be detained for one week before being brought before a prosecutor.[44]

Recommendation

• Bring counter-terrorism and national security legislation into line with international standards, particularly in relation to the definition of terrorism and the length of custody and pre-trial detention.

3.4.3 Non-refoulement

The Law on the Regulation of Political Asylum, provided to us by the NHRI, was adopted in September 2018 and sets out the conditions for the granting of political asylum.[45] A number of the provisions lack legal certainty, including Article 13, which stipulates that individuals may be deported if they participate in “political activities” while in Qatar or if they are deemed to pose a threat to national security or the public order.[46]

Furthermore, while Article 15 stipulates that an individual may not be extradited to a country where they may be subjected to “harm” or “persecution”, this provision remains vague and does not meet the standards of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 3 of the UNCAT.

In May 2017, Qatar violated its obligations under Article 3 of the UNCAT when it extradited human rights defender and co-founder of the Union for Human Rights Mohammed Al Otaibi to Saudi Arabia.[47] Al Otaibi was arrested at Doha airport while on his way to Norway, where he had been granted political asylum. While in prison in Saudi Arabia, he was held incommunicado for two weeks, spent three months in solitary confinement,[48] and was denied access to medical care. On 25 January 2018, Al Otaibi was sentenced to 14 years in prison in Saudi Arabia on charges related to his peaceful activism, including “abusing the Kingdom on Twitter” and “calling to change the basic system of governance”.

Finally, Qatar has not ratified the Refugee Convention, nor its 1967 Optional Protocol.

Recommendations

• Amend the Law on Regulating Political Asylum in order to bring it into line with international standards, including Article 3 of the UNCAT; 
• Ratify the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Optional Protocol.

3.4.4 Death penalty and corporal punishment

The Qatari Penal Code authorises the use of flogging, stoning and other forms of corporal   punishment for certain crimes, including theft, banditry and adultery, when the plaintiff is Muslim.[49] In addition, it allows for the application of the death penalty for crimes that do not meet the threshold of the “most serious crimes” under international law.[50]

Between 2014 and 2017, Qatar handed out 16 death sentences, but did not carry out any executions.[51]

Finally, the Law on Combating Terrorism imposes the death penalty for a wide-range of vaguely-defined terrorist acts.[52]

Recommendations

• Legally abolish corporal punishment as a sentence for a crime;
• Establish a moratorium on executions and commute death sentences to prison sentences, with a view to abolish the death penalty. In the meantime, ensure that the death penalty is only imposed for those crimes that fall within the category of the “most serious crimes” and after trials that fully comply with international fair trial standards.

3.5 Statelessness

Qatar has between 1,200 and 1,500 stateless people – also known as Bidoon – who claim to have a right to citizenship. The Bidoon face severe discrimination, including being denied the right to work legally or register for public health services and education.[53]

State legislation does not permit Qatari women married to non-Qataris to pass their nationality onto their children.[54] As such, the expulsion of citizens as part of the Gulf diplomatic crisis has resulted in family separations. In light of this, in September 2018, the cabinet adopted the Law on Permanent Residence, allowing the children of women married to non-Qataris to gain permanent residence and have access to public healthcare and education.[55] However, the law limits the granting of residency permits to 100 per year[56] and does not grant individuals Qatari citizenship.

The Law on the Acquisition of Qatari Nationality provides that individuals may only apply for Qatari nationality after having lived in the state for 25 consecutive years.[57]

Under Article 11 of the same law, individuals may have their nationality revoked as punishment for a number of vague acts, including joining “any authority, organisation, association or group whose purpose is to undermine the state”.

Between 2004 and 2005, the Qatari government revoked the nationality of 5000 members of the Al Murra tribe as collective punishment for the involvement of some of its members in an attempted coup in 1996.[58] While the authorities have now reinstated the nationality of some members, others who did not originally have their nationalities revoked run the risk of being subjected to this violation if they are considered to pose a threat to the government.

Recommendations

• Take steps towards granting nationality to the Bidoon and restoring the nationality of all members of the Al Murra tribe;
• Allow Qatari women to pass their nationality onto their children, beginning by lifting all reservations to the CEDAW, ICCPR and ICESCR on this issue;
• Bring the Law on the Acquisition of Qatari Nationality into line with international standards.