February 19, 2026
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Background
For many years, the systems of the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) have been abused to target political dissidents and human rights defenders and facilitate acts of transnational repression. INTERPOL red notices — requests to law enforcement bodies worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest individuals pending extradition — are frequently misused by repressive states to pursue activists across borders, putting them at risk of refoulement to countries where they face grave human rights abuses.
According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), transnational repression refers to “acts conducted or directed by a State, or its proxy, to deter, silence or punish dissent, criticism or human rights advocacy towards it, expressed from outside its territory.” These acts often target civil society actors abroad, including human rights defenders, civil society, journalists, and peaceful dissidents as well as their families or associates who remain in the repressing country.
Transnational repression is one of MENA Rights Group (MRG)’s thematic priorities. We document cases of human rights violations that fall under patterns of cross-border repression tactics at the hands of state authorities, regional bodies and international organisations. We represent victims of these violations before international human rights bodies, including United Nations (UN) Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures. To ensure the non-repetition of these violations, we identify patterns and root causes of transnational repression and bring our findings to the attention of relevant stakeholders to call for legal and policy reform.
Between 2018 and 2025, MRG documented the cases of 27 individuals and organisations targeted by acts of transnational repression in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Documented cases of transnational repression typically involve two states: the requesting state (often the state of origin), and the requested or participating state. The incidents recorded include politically motivated extradition proceedings, criminal prosecutions in absentia, kidnappings and deportations, terrorism listings, administrative sanctions, and a killing. Impacted individuals and organisations were targeted in relation to their peaceful dissent, political criticism, human rights advocacy or participation in peaceful protests.
How INTERPOL facilitates transnational repression
INTERPOL’s mandate and red notice system
The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) is an inter-governmental organisation of 196 member countries that aims to ensure and promote mutual assistance between criminal police authorities, and to establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.
According to articles 2 (1) and 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution, the organisation acts in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and cannot be used “to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character”. The UDHR notably prohibits torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and discrimination, including on political grounds, and protects the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
INTERPOL notices are international requests for cooperation issued by INTERPOL’s General Secretariat at the request of member countries. INTERPOL red notices aim to locate persons wanted for prosecution or to serve a sentence, and to provisionally arrest them pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action.
Subjects of INTERPOL’s red notices may request their removal by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF), an independent body which can review data in red notices and remove them if they violate INTERPOL’s Constitution. The Notices and Diffusions Task Force (NDTF), an institution established by INTERPOL’s Secretary General in 2016, may also unilaterally review notices’ compliance with INTERPOL’s Constitution, including by assessing the status of the individual concerned, notably whether they are deemed a political activist.
Systemic failures and human rights concerns
For many years, INTERPOL’s systems have been abused to target political dissidents and human rights defenders and facilitate acts of transnational repression. INTERPOL red notices are frequently misused by repressive states to pursue activists across borders, putting them at risk of extraditions to countries where they face grave human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearance.
Targets of abusive red notices are often unaware of their existence until they are arrested, and critics have pointed out that those impacted do not have the right to a hearing, to examine evidence that governments produce against them, or to appeal the CCF’s decisions.
In practice, MRG has engaged with INTERPOL on multiple occasions by filing requests for access to, or correction and/or deletion of data processed in the INTERPOL Information System with the CCF, on behalf of activists, peaceful dissidents and human rights defenders targeted by politically motivated and/or non-human rights compliant notices, in violation of INTERPOL’s Constitution.
The CCF’s review system poses several concerns. First, as individuals targeted by INTERPOL notices are arrested and put at imminent risk of extradition to countries where they face grave human rights abuses, their cases are inherently urgent in nature. Therefore, the removal of the notice issued against them should be carried out as promptly as possible, in order to effectively prevent a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. In practice, after filing access, correction or deletion requests on behalf of individuals targeted by abusive INTERPOL notices, MRG has experienced excessive delays in obtaining decisions from the CCF, with the process usually taking several months.
Second, pursuant to its Statute, the CCF does not provide the possibility for applicants to request provisional measures in urgent cases, as result of which notices could at least temporarily be removed or blocked in order to allow for the targeted person’s extradition to be delayed or for them to be released from detention pending extradition.
As a result, targets of INTERPOL notices can find themselves detained for months on the basis of an INTERPOL red notice while awaiting CCF review, or can be extradited to countries where they face grave human rights abuses before the CCF has issued its decision.
Documented cases of INTERPOL-enabled repression
Among the cases of transnational repression recorded by MRG, four individuals were subjected to INTERPOL red notices which put them at risk of extraditions violating the principle of non-refoulement.
Mohamed al-Kayali, a Syrian human rights defender, was arrested in Türkiye in December 2024, based on an INTERPOL red notice requested by Saudi authorities in 2016. Following an urgent appeal submitted by MRG, UN Special Procedures issued a communication to the Turkish authorities expressing concern about his detention and risk of extradition to Saudi Arabia, where he would face serious risk of torture and ill-treatment. Al-Kayali was subsequently released.
In January 2022, after being arrested in Serbia on the basis of an INTERPOL red notice, Bahraini dissident and asylum seeker Ahmed Jaafar Mohamed Ali was extradited to Bahrain, despite interim measures issued by the European Court of Human Rights citing risks of torture and urging the Serbian authorities to halt the extradition.
Chinese national and Uyghur Muslim Idris Hasan (or Yidiresi Aishan) was arrested in Morocco in July 2021 on the basis of a red notice requested by the Chinese government. Despite INTERPOL’s subsequent withdrawal of the notice, the Moroccan authorities continued to detain him on extradition grounds until he was finally released in February 2025. Following an appeal filed by MRG, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared his detention arbitrary under international law.
Osama al-Hasani, an Australian-Saudi national, was arrested in February 2021 in Morocco on the basis of an INTERPOL red notice issued upon Saudi Arabia’s request. When Morocco’s Court of Cassation ruled in favour of al-Hasani’s extradition in March 2021, MRG submitted a request for interim measures before the UN Committee against Torture, invoking a possible violation of the non-refoulement principle by Morocco. Despite the UN Committee’s request to refrain from extraditing al-Hasani, Moroccan authorities extradited him to Saudi Arabia, where he has been arbitrarily detained.
The 2025 CCF statute amendments
In November 2025, during its 93rd General Assembly, INTERPOL approved amendments to the Statute of the CCF. Prior to their adoption, INTERPOL had invited stakeholders to comment on proposed amendments, and MRG had submitted a written contribution identifying several concerns and making concrete recommendations for strengthening safeguards against abuse.
Among key concerns raised, MRG warned that the draft amendments would expand the role of INTERPOL's General Secretariat in assessing requests before the CCF could conduct its independent review. This was concerning because the General Secretariat lacks independence as it reports to member states, some of which are responsible for the abusive notices challenged by applicants such as civil society organisations. MRG argued this would undermine the CCF's ability to conduct independent reviews.
Second, MRG raised concerns about proposed article 28(3) which would allow the CCF to dismiss requests deemed “abusive, improper, or bad faith”, without clearly defining what constitutes such abuse or requiring that applicants be notified with reasoning. MRG warned this could unfairly penalise genuine applicants challenging politically motivated notices.
The amended CCF Statute reflected MRG's primary recommendation regarding article 28 by introducing a new paragraph requiring the CCF to notify applicants and provide reasoning when taking decisions under article 28(3), including when dismissing requests deemed abusive. This directly addressed MRG's concern that the draft amendments lacked procedural safeguards for applicants whose requests might be dismissed. However, other recommendations made by MRG, including the introduction of an appeals mechanism for applicants whose requests are dismissed as abusive, were not adopted.
Moreover, the amendments introduced other problematic provisions that undermine the CCF's independence. Notably, article 33(5) requires the CCF to consider complaints about new red notice requests only after the General Secretariat has decided on compliance, effectively allowing notices to be published before the CCF can intervene. Additionally, the amendments did not address the systemic issues of excessive delays in CCF review or the absence of provisional measures mechanisms raised by MRG.
Cooperation with the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council (AIMC)
In 1999, INTERPOL signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council (AIMC). Often misleadingly referred to as “Arab INTERPOL”, the AIMC is an Arab League body tasked with enhancing cooperation among Arab states in the fields of internal security and crime prevention. Through its Department of Criminal Prosecution and Data, the AIMC circulates state-requested warrants Arab League Member States and facilitate wanted individuals’ extradition.
In 2022, INTERPOL and the AIMC signed a cooperation agreement replacing the 1999 MoU “for purpouses of broadening the scope of their future cooperation.” The agreement aims to strengthen and develop collaboration and coordination between the two entities in matters of police cooperation and fight against crime; ensure coordination and avoid duplication of efforts in the implementation of their respective mandates and projects; and lay down the legal framework governing the exchange of data and information between INTERPOL and the AIMC General Secretariat.
The preamble of the 2022 cooperation agreement refers to INTERPOL’s Constitution, including the organisation’s aim to act “in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, and recalls that INTERPOL is “strictly forbidden to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character”. The MoU also provides that data shall be exchanged “with due respect for national laws, international law and INTERPOL’s and AIMC’s mandates, respective rules and regulations.”
When questioned about this cooperation in 2023, INTERPOL’s spokesperson told MRG that INTERPOL and the AIMC each have their own database and corresponding legal framework, and neither organisation can dictate to the other what action to take in relation to wanted persons. Reportedly, if AIMC member countries communicate with the AIMC or use its channels in relation to individuals, INTERPOL is not involved in any way, nor can it intervene. The spokesperson added that INTERPOL does not work on notices or diffusions directly with the AIMC, the reference to “technical cooperation” in the MoU simply reflecting standard language for memoranda of understanding and agreements.
However, these provisions and assurances fail to address fundamental structural concerns. While the agreement’s preamble references human rights protections, the AIMC has no effective mechanism to ensure compliance with these principles. Although the AIMC’s warrant circulation system operates similarly to INTERPOL's practices, the Arab League council lacks any body comparable to INTERPOL’s CCF or NDTF, or any independent oversight mechanism capable of filtering out abuses of its systems.
The AIMC reportedly established a Legal Committee whose mandate suggests the possibility of an individual’s right to challenge an arrest warrant. However, the actual process for doing so is uncertain and lacks accessibility. Moreover, the composition of this Legal Committee reportedly includes representatives from Member States, raising concerns about the impartiality and independence of its functioning. In practice, according to MRG’s documentation, individuals targeted by AIMC-circulated warrants and at risk of extradition do not have the possibility to file access requests or to demand the removal of the warrants issued against them.
Additionally, pursuant to the 2022 INTERPOL-AIMC agreement, while the provision of data by INTERPOL to the AIMC is subject to compliance with INTERPOL’s Constitution, rules and regulations, the provision of data by the AIMC to INTERPOL is subject to the compliance with the AIMC’s Constitution, rules and regulations. This is particularly concerning given that the AIMC's Basic Laws make no reference to human rights standards.
Moreover, the AIMC’s legal framework includes instruments such as the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation. Although this instrument contains a provision prohibiting extraditions for political offenses, it also excludes a number of offences from being defined as political and permits extraditions for lèse-majesté, or acts deemed as offensive to kings or heads of state. As such, this restrictive interpretation of political offences enables transnational repression through the extradition of individuals on political grounds, in direct contradiction with INTERPOL’s Constitution.
Between 2022 and 2025, MRG documented eight individual cases of transnational repression in the form political extraditions between Arab League member states. All cases involved peaceful dissidents, protestors or members of religious minorities facing refoulement to Arab League countries where they risked grave human rights abuses, including enforced disappearance. Requested and requesting states included Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the UAE. Five individuals were extradited and have since been arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared in the requesting country, two were released and are living in exile, and one is currently forcibly disappeared and at imminent risk of extradition.
The AIMC’s role in transnational repression has garnered serious concerns by UN human rights experts, including the UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights and the UN Committee against Torture, as well as by civil society.
Conclusion and recommendations
In light of the above-mentioned considerations, MENA Rights Group makes the following recommendations:
To States:
- Cease abusing INTERPOL systems to target individuals on political grounds and/or for exercising their fundamental rights and freedoms;
- Conduct independent assessments of INTERPOL red notices’ compliance with international human rights law, including the principles of non-refoulement and non-discrimination.
To INTERPOL:
- Strengthen review and compliance systems to ensure that individuals are not targeted by INTERPOL notices on political grounds, for their exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms, or in violation of international human rights law, including the principle of non-refoulement;
- Introduce a formal process for applicants to request provisional measures in urgent cases, modelled on the practices implemented by the UN Committee against Torture and the UN Human Rights Committee, to ensure that notices can promptly be removed or blocked (at least temporarily) in order to allow for the targeted person’s extradition to be delayed or for them to be released from detention pending extradition;
- Suspend or reform cooperation with the AIMC until the Arab League body establishes an independent oversight mechanism comparable to INTERPOL's CCF, with the ability to review and remove politically motivated warrants and grant targeted individuals the right to challenge warrants issued against them.
