The influence of MENA states in the UN counter-terrorism architecture

For many years, states across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have systematically abused security frameworks, including those related to counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE).

While the adoption of CT and P/CVE laws and policies accelerated after 9/11, these frameworks became especially embedded and stringent after the Arab uprisings in 2011. In numerous cases, they have been instrumentalised to suppress peaceful dissent, silence political opposition, and target human rights defenders and civil society. These state-led securitisation measures have been implemented in particularly coercive ways, undermining the rule of law and entrenching authoritarian forms of governance.

At the same time, the global CT architecture[1][1] has played a central role in reinforcing these domestic trends by enabling and legitimising the abuse of security frameworks by repressive MENA governments. Some of the region’s state authorities with the worst human rights records related to CT and P/CVE abuse have secured influential positions within the global CT system, notably at the United Nations (UN), and have actively sought to shape international CT norms and policies in a manner that undermines the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

This briefing paper aims to highlight that certain MENA states are fundamentally ill-suited to influence international CT policy-making due to their persistent abuse of CT measures to violate human rights. The paper focuses on five key countries – Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel/Palestine – each of which exercise significant influence within the global CT architecture while maintaining highly problematic human rights records related to CT and P/CVE.

This briefing paper was developed with support from the CSO Coalition on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism. The views expressed in this briefing paper do not represent the positions of all members of the CSO Coalition on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism or its Secretariat.

2.1 UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)

The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) was established in 2017 by the UN General Assembly to assist Member States in implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS). The UNOCT is mandated to provide capacity-building to states, coordinate the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, and implement counter-terrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programmes. UNOCT is led by Under Secretary-General Vladimir Voronkov.

2.2 UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

The UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) was established in 2011 through funding from Saudi Arabia to support international counter-terrorism cooperation. When UNOCT was established, the functions of UNCCT moved under UNOCT. The UNCCT is mandated to support the development of national and regional counter-terrorism strategies to align with the UN GCTS and provide capacity building to states.

2.3 UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)

The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) is a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council, comprised of all Council members, established in 2001 under UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). The CTC’s mandate is to oversees states’ implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1373 and subsequent counter-terrorism resolutions.

2.4 UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)

The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) was established through UN Security Council resolution 1535 (2004) to assist the CTC in supporting and monitoring states’ implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1373 and others. The CTED is mandated to provide legal and technical expertise to states, conducts official assessment visits to states, and drafts reports and research requested by the CTC.

2.5 UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was formed in 1997 with a mandate focusing on drug control, crime prevention, anti-corruption, and counter-terrorism. The Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) was established within UNODC and is tasked with providing assistance in implementing international counter-terrorism instruments and conducting research on terrorism.

2.6 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact was established in 2018. It includes 46 entities from across the UN and international system and is intended to improve coordination of counter-terrorism programming and assistance. Compact members include UNOCT, CTED, UNODC, as well as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, and the Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide. In addition to many UN entities, the Compact also includes INTERPOL and FATF.

2.7 Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF)

The Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) is an informal, multilateral counter-terrorism platform launched in 2011. The GCTF comprises 32 member states and focuses on civilian capacity building and developing non-binding “good practices” for policy-makers in counter-terrorism. The GCTF has several working groups, including the West Africa Working Group (WAWG), Criminal Justice and Rule of Law (CJ-ROL), and the Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism.

2.8 Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is multilateral body that sets international standards to prevent money laundering and counter terrorism financing. FATF assesses implementation of its standards through country evaluations and produces research on trends in money laundering and terrorism financing. Established in 1989, FATF now has 40 members and several regional associate members, including MENAFATF.

Algeria holds a prominent position in the global CT architecture. It sits on the board of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), is a founding member of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), and  co-chairs the GCTF’s West Africa Working Group (WAWG), supported by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). For both years of its Security Council membership (2024-2025), Algeria chaired the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Algeria is also a member of the MENA Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

At the regional level, Algeria is host to the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), which works closely with the AU and the UN Security Council on CT issues.

During Algeria’s presidency of the UN Security Council in January 2025, the ‘Algeria Guiding Principles’ on ‘preventing, detecting and disrupting the use of new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes’, prepared in accordance with the Delhi Declaration, were adopted. Although civil society was consulted during the drafting process – which began well before Algeria was a member of the UN Security Council – the final text of the principles differs considerably from the draft that NPOs gave input to.[2][2] Algeria is due to host a conference to formally launch the Algeria Guiding Principles in 2025.

This international leadership role stands in stark contrast to Algeria’s increasingly repressive CT practices at the national level. The country’s CT legal framework, primarily contained in article 87 bis of the Penal Code, has long garnered criticism for its lack of compliance with international standards. The definition of terrorism, encompassing acts targeting “state security”, “national unity”, and “territorial integrity”, was criticised by the UN Human Rights Committee as “overly broad and vague” and for “allow[ing] for the prosecution of actions that might constitute exercise of the freedom of expression or peaceful assembly”. Despite these concerns, Algeria has introduced new amendments to the Penal Code in recent years, including in 2021 and 2024. UN experts have warned that these changes expanded the already broad definition of terrorism in ways “not likely to meet [the] need for conceptual clarity” and created a “national list of terrorist persons and entities” lacking the possibility of judicial appeal.

In practice, Algeria’s CT framework has been repeatedly used to crack down on civic space and target dissent. Following their respective visits to Algeria in late 2023, the former Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders expressed alarm over the abuse of CT laws to persecute activists and human rights defenders. A prominent example is the case of Mohamed Tadjadit, a renowned poet and leading figure of the Hirak movement, who has been subjected to continued judicial harassment since 2019 in reprisal for his peaceful dissent. In January 2024, Tadjadit was investigated for “glorification of terrorism” and “using communication technologies to support the actions and activities of terrorist organisations”, based on private Facebook Messenger conversations he had with members of Rachad, later classified as a terrorist organisation under the amended Penal Code.

In another emblematic case, 15 Hirak activists and members of the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, LADDH) were charged with “membership to a terrorist or subversive organisation active abroad or in Algeria” in April 2021. The targeted individuals included human rights defender Jamila Loukil and her husband Kaddour Chouicha, vice-president of the now dissolved LADDH. The court of first instance acquitted all defendants in December 2023, and the court of appeal upheld the decision in February 2025.

According to exiled activist Zakaria Hannache, as of 1 May 2025, 247 people are imprisoned in Algeria for exercising their fundamental rights, many of whom were arbitrarily accused of terrorism. 

Algerian authorities have also stepped up their use of travel bans, known as interdiction de sortie du territoire national (ISTN), as an instrument of political repression, particularly in the context of the crackdown on the Hirak pro-democracy movement. In terrorism-related cases, the Algerian Code of Criminal Procedure provides that travel bans may be extended until the investigation is completed, rendering their duration uncertain and indefinite.

A telling example is the case of eight activists and former members of the National Committee for the Liberation of Detainees, a group established during the Hirak protest movement to document arrests and prosecutions and to support people detained for their opinions or activism, who were placed under arbitrary travel bans in 2021. All eight had been charged with “inciting an unarmed gathering,” “insulting public officials,” “receiving funds to commit acts likely to undermine state security,” and “belonging to a terrorist organisation” under article 87 bis of the Penal Code. In June 2021, an Algiers investigative judge placed them under judicial supervision and imposed a travel ban including seizure of their passports. Although all were acquitted in November 2022 and their acquittals upheld on appeal in January 2024, their passports remain confiscated. While the defence requested that the activists’ passports be returned, the public prosecutor replied that the judgment was not yet final and noted that it had been appealed to the Supreme Court. A response from the Supreme Court could take years, restricting their ability to travel outside the country for the long term.

Egypt plays a significant role in the global CT architecture. It holds a seat on the board of the UNCCT, and currently co-chairs the GCTF with the European Union. Previously, Egypt also co-chaired the GCTF’s Criminal Justice and Rule of Law (CJ-ROL) Working Group with the United States. Additionally, the UNODC and the Prosecutor General of Egypt signed a Memorandum of Understanding notably aimed at enhancing cooperation for criminal justice responses to terrorism-related crimes. Egypt is also a member of the MENAFATF.

In May 2017, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on a comprehensive international framework to counter “terrorist narratives”, prompted by an initiative led by Egypt during its presidency of the Security Council in May 2016. Egypt has also been leading negotiations on counterpart UN resolutions on Terrorism and Human Rights in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and at the Human Rights Council. The UNGA resolution has been criticised for failing to include sufficient protections for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of countering terrorism.

At the domestic level, Egypt’s CT laws and policies are systematically abused to commit widespread human rights violations. The country’s 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law and Terrorist Entities Law impose harsh penalties and rely on terrorism offenses defined by notions such as “harming national unity” and “disturbing public order”, criticised by the UN Human Rights Committee for being overly broad and vague. UN Special Procedures found that these laws’ CT provisions “go beyond the scope necessary to CT and severely limit civic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms in Egypt.” 

The Human Rights Committee raised concerns about extended detention without charges in terrorism cases, and the absence of fair trial safeguards. UN experts also raised concerns over Egypt’s “use of repeated and similar national security and terrorism related charges against human rights defenders in detention”. In January 2025, the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders denounced Egypt’s routine abuse of CT legislation and recycling criminal charges against human rights defenders, highlighting the “continued detention of human rights defenders past their release date by repeatedly charging them with similar, if not identical, terrorism-related accusations, in a practice commonly known as ‘rotation’ or ‘recycling’”. UN experts have warned that this practice is used to “indefinitely extend the detention of dissenting voices, journalists, human rights defenders and political opponents”. 

The UN Human Rights Committee also expressed concern over Egyptian authorities’ use of administrative CT measures, including the listing of thousands of human rights defenders, activists, and political dissidents as terrorists without due process, as well as the imposition of lengthy travel bans, asset freezes, and dismissals from public employment.

Among the most prominent imprisoned human rights defenders is British-Egyptian activist Alaa Abdelfattah. Detained on terrorism or national security charges for most of the last 14 years, he should have been released in September 2024, but Egyptian authorities have kept him imprisoned, and reportedly told his lawyer that he won’t reunite with his family until 2027. UN experts called for his release in February 2025 and urged Egypt to “cease the misuse of counter-terror laws”. 

Another prominent case is Hoda Abdel Moneim, a woman human rights defender who was arrested during a crackdown on human rights lawyers and activists in 2018. While her sentence ended in November 2023, Abdel Moneim was detained again under new terrorism-related charges, with a third set of charges brought against her in 2024. She currently faces two new trials, and was also put on the list of terrorists, which places her under a travel ban and subjects her to an asset freeze. Despite five communications by UN Special Procedures on her case, she remains in detention.

It is estimated that Egypt holds around 60,000 political prisoners.

Saudi Arabia plays a central role in the international CT architecture, particularly at the UN level. Saudi Arabia is the largest donor of the UNCCT, with a contribution of $110 million, equating to 69% of the Centre’s total contributions. The UNCCT was established following a founding donation by Saudi Arabia, which has held the Chair of its Advisory Board ever since. Ambassador Abdulaziz Al-Wasil, Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the UN, serves as Chair of the UNCCT’s Advisory Board and is one of three individuals listed as the UNOCT’s management, alongside UNCCT Executive Director Vladimir Voronkov and Director Mauro Miedico. 

Saudi Arabia’s funding appears to be of key importance to the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)’s viability. According to an Audit of the Trust Fund for Counter-Terrorism, managed by UNOCT since its creation in 2017, Saudi Arabia’s $110 million contribution was expected to be depleted by the second quarter of 2023, and UNOCT therefore faced challenges to secure stable funding. To address this situation, UNOCT senior management reportedly “held discussions” with Saudi Arabia about “prospects for future funding”. Additionally, UNOCT maintains partnerships with Saudi organisations tied to the government and engaged in CT and P/CVE, such as the Global Centre for Combatting Extremist Ideology (Etidal) and King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS).

Saudi Arabia is also a founding members of the GCTF, and is a member of both the FATF and the MENAFATF. 

In April 2025, the UNCCT co-organised a roundtable on ‘the Impact of New Technologies on Countering the Financing of Terrorism’ with the Saudi State Security Presidency (SSP), Saudi Arabia’s main security body and notorious arm of repression. The High-Level opening session featured a speech by the head of the SSP, Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed al-Howairini, who is known to have been involved the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018.

Saudi Arabia has a highly concerning record of abusing its security and CT framework to commit human rights abuses. The definition of terrorism contained in Saudi Arabia’s 2017 Law on Combating Crimes of Terrorism and its Financing has been criticised by UN Special Procedures for being overly broad, with ambiguous terms such as “disturbing public order”, “destabilising national security or state stability” and “endangering national unity”, which “could entail that a range of speech and association activities protected under international human rights law is characterized domestically as ‘terrorism’.”

Saudi Arabia’s State Security Apparatus, namely the SSP, the Public Prosecution Office (PPO), and the Specialised Criminal Court (SSC), which form the Kingdom’s institutional framework governing security and counter-terrorism matters, lacks independence from the executive, and plays a central role in enabling human rights abuses under the guise of countering terrorism.

An emblematic case is that of Manahel al-Otaibi, a 30-year-old fitness instructor and women’s rights activist convicted of “terrorist offences” due to her tweets in support of women’s rights and Snapchat photos of her not wearing a abaya. Detained since 2022, she was forcibly disappeared and subjected to torture. In January 2024, she was sentenced to 11 years in prison for her online advocacy by the SCC, and her sentence was upheld on appeal in November 2024, following a secret trial marred by due process violations. UN Special Procedures raised her case in a communication sent to Saudi authorities, highlighting that her case illustrates Saudi Arabia’s systematic use of its counter-terrorism law and SCC to “restrain and punish the legitimate exercise of rights protected under international human rights law” and “quash criticism, dissent and opposition to the Government and royal family”.

Another recent case is that of journalist Turki al-Jasser, who was executed in June 2025 on false charges of terrorism after he spent seven years in SSP-run detention facilities, where he was detained incommunicado.

In addition to criminal prosecutions, Saudi authorities impose administrative counter-terrorism measures onto peaceful activists and their families, including travel bans. Defined as “official orders that prevent a particular citizen or group of citizens from entering or leaving the country”, the authorities impose two types travel bans on individuals suspected of or prosecuted for terrorism: “official” travel bans, systematically issued by the SCC for a duration equal to the prison sentence; and “unofficial” travel bans, imposed by the SSP and PPO without any judicial oversight or notification to the concerned individual, “if security interests so require” or “if the investigation so requires”.

The case of Loujain al-Hathloul, a prominent Saudi women’s rights defender who was jailed for campaigning against the driving ban and the male guardianship system, illustrates both types of travel bans. In December 2020, she was sentenced by the SCC to five years and eight months in prison (partially suspended), in addition to a five-year “official” travel ban. Conditionally released in February 2021, her sentence was upheld in March 2021, and she remains under a travel ban in Saudi Arabia to this day. 

In addition, since 2018, al-Hathloul’s parents have been under an “unofficial”, open-ended travel ban, discovered only at the airport while they attempted to travel. Despite many inquiries with the authorities, they were never provided any legal documentation or formal explanation. The travel bans have been the cause of the separation of their family for years: while her siblings live abroad, al-Hathloul and her parents remain in Saudi Arabia with no knowledge about the basis or duration of their bans. 

The UAE has an influential position within the global CT architecture. The UAE served as the chair of the CTC of the UN Security Council in 2023, and joined the UNCCT’s board in 2024. The country is a founding member of the GCTF, and served as co-chair of the GCTF Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism until 2017. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes the UAE, is also a member of FATF. The UNOCT and UNCCT maintain partnerships with Emirati entities linked to the government which are engaged in CT and P/CVE, including SawabCenter and Hedayah. Heyadah is one of three “GCTF inspired institutions” established shortly after the GCTF was founded “to complement and reinforce the Forum’s activities across the globe.” 

In June 2023, while presiding over the UN Security Council, the UAE co-sponsored the adoption of a resolution on “Human Fraternity”, criticised for containing broad and vaguely defined references to fighting “extremism”. In December 2023, during the UAE’s final month as chair, the CTC adopted the ‘Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles’ on ‘threats posed by the use of unmanned aerial aircraft systems for terrorist purposes’. The UAE supported the UN Secretary General’s 2016 ‘Plan of action to prevent violent extremism’, and reportedly played an active role in the resolution on ‘the flow of foreign terrorist fighters’ negotiations, adopted by the UN Security Council during the U.S. presidency in 2014. 

At the domestic level, the UAE’s 2014 Law on Combatting Terrorism Offences contains vague and overly broad provisions that severely restrict fundamental rights and freedoms. UN Special Procedures criticised the law’s definition of terrorism for failing to define the term directly, instead referring to “terrorist purpose” and “terrorist result”, which “essentially remain undefined, as one definition refers or defers to another without clearly providing a concrete and constrained definition of the activities they encompass”. UN experts expressed concern that the CT law’s ambiguity could allow forms of criticism or dissent to be interpreted and prosecuted as terrorism, seemingly at the subjective discretion of the relevant authorities. 

The 2023 Law on Combatting Discrimination, Hatred and Extremism raises similar concerns, particularly due to its definition of “extremism” and the vague references to “disruption of public order” and “incitement to hate speech.” The law also provides that “freedom of opinion and expression may not be invoked” to justify statement deemed blasphemous or harmful, creating the risk that UAE authorities may abuse the law to restrict and suppress fundamental freedoms protected under international law, under the guise of countering extremism.

Members of the Emirati State Security Apparatus are the main agents of CT-related repression, and are responsible for many human rights abuses committed against human rights defenders, journalists and whistle-blowers.

While hosting COP28 in December 2023, the UAE brought terrorism charges against 84 political dissidents and human rights defenders, referred to as the “UAE84”, and sentenced them to harsh prison sentences in the country’s second-largest political mass trial. Many had already been imprisoned following the “UAE94” political mass trial in 2013, in retaliation for forming an independent advocacy group. In July 2024, 53 defendants were sentenced to between 10 years and life in prison, and an Emirati court rejected all appeals filed by their lawyers on 4 March 2025. The decision is final and cannot be further appealed. UN Special Procedures denounced the arbitrary terrorism charges and proceedings brought against the “UAE84” in three communications issued in December 2023, January 2024, and July 2024.  

The UAE also employs administrative measures, such as citizenship stripping and the denial of identity documents, to target peaceful government critics and human rights defenders arbitrarily accused of terrorism. Many of the defendants in the “UAE94” and “UAE84” trials, and their family members, have been denied the renewal of their passport or identity documents, or seen their Emirati nationality be revoked without due process, in violation of the Emirati Nationality Law and the UAE’s international obligations. This concerning practice places concerned individuals in situations of – or at serious risk of – statelessness, depriving them of their basic rights and protections and severely impacting their day to day lives.

UN counter-terrorism bodies, particularly the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), have close ties with the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), a research institute of Israel’s Reichman University that positions itself as “one of the leading academic institutes for counter-terrorism in the world.” While the ICT claims to be an independent entity, a significant portion of its leadership and members have held high-ranking position in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) or in the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), or are former intelligence service members of the Mossad. The CTED’s leadership regularly participate in the ICT’s annual World Summits, and continuously affirmed its strong partnership with the ICT. Among the ICT’s Advisory Board members are David Scharia, CTED Director and Chief of Branch, Jean Paul Laborde, former CTED Executive Director from 2013 to 2017, and Mike Smith, former Assistant Secretary-General of the UN in New York and CTED Executive Director from 2007 to 2013. 

According to Israel’s permanent mission to the UN, “Israeli experts contribute their expertise in several Counter-Terrorism programs at the UN, working towards a shared goal of combatting widespread dissemination of terrorist practices.” The Israeli mission stated that it continuously sends “its best experts to the UNOCT Training Center in Rabat,” to provide “training to public security officials from different government branches with regard to Counter-Terrorism investigations and criminal prosecution.” 

Israel is also a member of FATF.

In parallel, Israel has systematically weaponised the rhetoric of the fight against terrorism to commit human rights abuses against Palestinians. In 2021, Israel’s listing of 6 Palestinian civil society organisations as terrorist organisations was condemned by UN experts, who described the listing as a “misuse of counter-terrorism measures by the government of Israel undermining the security of all.”  In a letter addressed to then-President of the UN Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the UN, Gilhad Erdan, justified the terrorism listing of the 6 organisations with references to UN Security Council Resolutions and FATF recommendations. Civil society organisations from the Global NPO Coalition on FATF expressed concern that “by tying implementation of FATF standards to these designations, the Israel government is politicising the FATF process.”

Since October 2023, Israeli authorities have used the pretext of countering terrorism to commit a genocide in Gaza, resulting in over 50,000 people killed, over 100,000 injured, at least 10,000 people buried under the rubble, and 90% of the population forcibly displaced. Israel has also used terrorism accusations to ban UNRWA, Gaza’s main aid agency, despite the catastrophic humanitarian impact for Palestinians and violations of its international obligations. 

In this context, Israeli authorities have increasingly used CT and security laws, including the Unlawful Combatants Law, to arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappear thousands of Palestinians. This law allows the Israeli authorities to arrest Palestinian residents of Gaza, including on suspicions of engaging in hostilities against Israel, belonging to a terrorist organisation or posing a threat to state security, to try them before Israeli civil courts, and to detain them without charges and for indefinitely renewable periods, based on undisclosed evidence.

UN Special Procedures have repeatedly raised concerns about the Unlawful Combatants Law’s lack of compliance with international standards, including in November 2023, May 2024, and following a country visit in November 2007. 

As of May 2025, according to Israeli human rights organisation HaMoked, the Israel Prison Service (IPS) was holding nearly 10,068 Palestinians under the classification of “security” detainees and prisoners, including 1,747 held under the Unlawful Combatants Law. In March 2025, Israeli authorities disclosed that they were holding approximately 3,500 individuals as “unlawful combatants.” This figure, significantly higher than the number reported by the IPS, indicates that the majority of Palestinians held under the Unlawful Combatants Law are not detained in regular prison facilities operated by the IPS, but rather in military detention camps administered by the Israeli military authorities. In April 2025, the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and Hamoked reported that around 6,800 Palestinians were detained by Israel outside the regular criminal justice process, and approximately 3,436 were captured in Gaza and are held as “unlawful combatants”.

Among them is Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya, one of the most prominent Palestinian doctors in Gaza and director of Kamal Adwan Hospital. Arrested in the context of a major operation launched by Israeli military forces against the hospital in December 2024, Dr Abu Safiya was detained, forcibly disappeared, and subjected to torture. His detention was extended for another six months in March 2025, and he currently remains detained without charges, under Israel’s Unlawful Combatants Law. The Special Rapporteur on Palestine addressed a communication on his case to the Israeli government, but received no response. As reported by the Special Rapporteur as well as human rights organisations, Israel’s targeted attacks on medical facilities and health care workers contributes to the decimation and collapse of Gaza’s healthcare system, which is a component of Israel’s genocide on Gaza.

UN experts have continued to urge Israel and its allies to end the genocide. 

In conclusion, counter-terrorism laws, measures, and rhetoric across the MENA region continue to be employed to silence dissent, restrict civic space, and target human rights defenders, and commit widespread abuses, including arbitrary detention, torture, unfair trials, executions, and genocide. 

At the same time, states with deeply problematic CT-related human rights records occupy prominent and influential positions within the global CT architecture, and play a central role in shaping the global CT agenda.

This contradiction illustrates a fundamental flaw: those most responsible for abusing CT frameworks domestically are being empowered to define international CT standards and policies. Their influence not only legitimises repressive practices beyond national borders, but also reflects a broader systemic failure, where human rights are not central to the global CT agenda but are instead sacrificed in the name of security.

Moving forward, it is crucial that states consistently violating human rights under the pretext of fighting terrorism, whether in the MENA region or elsewhere, are no longer rewarded with leadership and standard-setting roles within the international CT system, but are held accountable for their abuses.